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The 2002 Copenhagen European Council confirmed that the first wave of enlargement
will take place in 2004 and this undoubtedly constitutes one of the most important
developments in the history of European integration. Provided that the accession
process is completed, ten new Member States, namely Cyprus, the Czech Republic,
Hungary, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia and the three Baltic States (Estonia, Latvia
and Lithuania) will soon join the EU. Around 2007, Bulgaria and Romania will
probably also join. Previous enlargements have taken place in the past,1 but the
imminent accession of ten countries, mainly from Central and Eastern Europe, is
unprecedented not only in terms of scale, but also for its political symbolism: for these
states, EU membership confirms the success of their democratic and economic
transition efforts and represents their (re-)integration to the European family after
decades of political isolation.
Much has already been written about the impact of eastward enlargement on the EU’s
institutional framework and current EU policies.2 This paper deals with the recent
measures implemented in candidate countries to control asylum migration to the
enlarged EU. In particular, it assesses the impact of accession on the candidate
countries’ asylum and immigration laws and policies. In order to do so, the paper
examines the ways in which candidate countries are responding to increasing asylum
migration from the East and argue that recent changes in asylum and immigration laws
in candidate countries have been largely affected by current EU efforts to devise a
common immigration policy and a possible common asylum system. Instead of devising
their own response to asylum migration, candidate countries are merely aligning their
asylum policies with EU practice and expectations.
Because of their geographical location, the new Member States will be responsible for
policing the new Eastern border of the EU and receiving asylum seekers travelling from
further East. Cyprus and Malta are thus excluded from the analysis which only
examines the candidate countries from Central and Eastern Europe. Current EU
Member States are very concerned about illegal migration from the East and are putting
considerable pressure on candidate countries to set up efficient asylum systems and,
more importantly to them, strict border controls. This paper does not deal with issues of
free movement of persons within the enlarged EU, but with the regulation of asylum
migration from outside the EU. Until recently, most of the academic literature had
concentrated on the emergence of EU immigration and asylum laws under the new Title
IV introduced at Amsterdam in 1998,3 and very little attention had been given to the
impact of these developments on candidate countries.4
Following a brief overview of the asylum situation(s) in candidate countries, the paper
then demonstrates how the changes recently implemented in candidate countries may
not be adapted to such asylum situation(s) because they mainly result from a policy
                                                
1 Denmark, Ireland and the UK first joined in 1973, Greece in 1981, Spain and Portugal in 1986, and
Austria, Finland and Sweden in 1995.
2 On issues of institutional reform in anticipation of enlargement, see for instance, Shaw (2001).
3 See, for instance, Guild and Harlow (2001), Hailbronner (1998); O’Keefe (1999), and Simpson
(1999).
4 For recent studies of asylum and immigration laws in candidate countries, see Byrne et al. (2002a) and
Laczko et al. (2002).2
transfer from EU Member States which have a totally different asylum situation. The
EU strategy for controlling asylum migration to the enlarged EU can be broken down
into several areas: setting up new asylum systems in candidate countries, restricting
entries through the imposition of visa requirements, preventing illegal entries by
reinforcing border controls and facilitating returns with the signature of re-admission
agreements. Frequent references will be made to Poland because of that country’s
strategic importance in terms of controlling the future Eastern border of the EU.5 It is by
far the largest candidate country both in terms of area (313,000 km
2) and population
(38.6 million inhabitants in 2000). Moreover, Poland has a strategic position since it
shares common borders with Germany to the West, Lithuania, Belarus, and Ukraine to
the East, and the Czech Republic and Slovakia to the South. It even has a common
border with the Russian Federation whose enclave around Kaliningrad is sandwiched
between Poland and Lithuania, both future EU Member States. Consequently, Poland
shares borders with a number of countries which are refugee-producing countries (such
as the Russian Federation for instance) on the doorstep of the future EU and/or for
which EU membership is a very distant prospect. The EU is also extremely concerned
about organized criminal networks operating in the former Soviet Republics which will
use Poland as an entry point into the enlarged EU. As a result, Poland constitutes a very
important country in terms of controlling the ‘main European migratory channel
between a disintegrating East and an integrating West’ (Jerczinski 1999: 105), and thus
for ensuring the EU’s internal security. Finally, Poland has so far pursued dynamic
Eastern policies towards its neighbours and the changes in asylum and immigration laws
demanded by its new EU partners are likely to have a significant impact on these
policies.
1 Recent and future asylum flows to Central and Eastern Europe
During the Cold War, the countries examined here were mainly refugee-producing
countries. The only country to have received some asylum-seekers in the late 1980s was
Hungary which took on refugees from neighbouring Romania (Wallace 2002: 609). In
the early 1990s, it also received asylum-seekers from the former Yugoslavia but most of
them returned to their country of origin as soon as the security conditions had improved.
Since the mid-1990s, most candidate countries have become transit countries for people
wanting to seek asylum further west. The number of asylum applications has increased
in most candidate countries but there are substantial differences between the countries.
Indeed, the Baltic countries still receive a relatively low number of asylum applications
whereas countries like the Czech Republic and Hungary have seen a dramatic increase
in the number of asylum applications. Nevertheless, when compared to the numbers of
asylum applications lodged in Western European countries, candidate countries clearly
do not face the same pressures.
So far, most asylum-seekers in candidate countries have not actually remained in these
countries and have often attempted to move to Western Europe. Since border controls
are still relatively strict between current EU Member States and candidate countries,
these asylum-seekers often remain ‘trapped’ in candidate countries which form a buffer
                                                
5 The analysis is partly based on interviews conducted in June 2002 in Poland with government
officials, non-governmental organizations dealing with refugees and asylum seekers, and academics.3
zone between Western Europe and poorer and more unstable regions in Asia. The
combination of migration pressure from the East following the disintegration of the
Soviet Union and restrictive migration policies in the EU have led Central and Eastern
European countries to become countries of destination. This phenomenon has been
described as the ‘closed sack’ effect (Byrne et al. 2002b: 28). This situation will be
confirmed with EU accession: more asylum-seekers will target the new Member States
as countries of destination. To anticipate this change and in order to gain EU
membership, these countries are under considerable pressure to implement major
changes to their asylum and immigration laws and policies.
Table 1
Numbers claiming asylum in candidate countries (1992-2001)
1992 1995 1998 2001
Czech Republic 817 1,413 4,082 18,087
Estonia - - 23 12
Hungary 458 130 7,097 9,554
Latvia - - 58 14
Lithuania - - 163 256
Poland 592 843 3,373 4,506
Slovakia 87 359 506 8,151
Slovenia - - 499 1,511
Source: UNHCR Statistical Yearbook 2001, Refugees, Asylum-seekers and Other Persons of
Concern-Trends in Displacement. Protection and Solutions, October 2002, Geneva, Annex C.1.
2 The integration of Justice and Home Affairs issues in the enlargement process
The initial accession criteria did not explicitly refer to Justice and Home Affairs issues
partly because the EU was only just getting involved in this area when enlargement was
envisaged. The enlargement process finds its origins in the Association agreements, also
called Europe agreements, which were signed between the EU and each country in the
1990s. The 1993 Copenhagen European Council confirmed that Central and Eastern
European countries could one day join the EU, and between 1994 and 1996, all of them
formally applied for EU membership. However, EU Member States have for a long time
refrained from giving specific dates for accession and pressure by candidate countries
was put on the EU to define a more specific pre-accession strategy.
Since 1993, the definition of the criteria for accession has been rather progressive and
piecemeal. The basic condition for enlargement is contained in Article 49 TEU which
provides that any European State which respects the principles of democracy, human
rights and the rule of law as set out in Article 6(1) TEU, may apply to become a
member of the EU. When identifying more detailed accession criteria, the challenge was4
to enlarge the EU without diluting it, that is, without endangering the process of further
integration. It is therefore crucial that new Member States can be integrated without
undermining the progress made since 1957. In addition, they must be able to follow the
current pace of integration without slowing it down.
The 1993 Copenhagen European Council identified three types of criteria. Candidate
countries must fulfil political criteria relating to the stability of institutions guaranteeing
democracy, the rule of law, respect for human rights and minority rights. The
importance of these criteria as an essential prerequisite for opening accession
negotiations was reaffirmed at the 1999 Helsinki European Council (Seiffarth 2000: 62)
and may explain why negotiations have not yet been opened with Turkey. Since one of
the EU’s primary aims remains the establishment of the internal market, candidate
countries must have a fully functioning market economy. Beyond the political and
economic criteria, candidate countries must also demonstrate their general ability to take
on the obligations of membership such as the adjustment of their administrative
structures and a guarantee that EU legislation will be properly implemented.
In order to help candidate countries fulfil accession criteria, reinforced pre-accession
strategies have been defined for each country and regularly updated since 1997 on the
basis of a Commission paper entitled ‘Agenda 2000’. The reinforced pre-accession
strategies are also based on the Europe agreements, the accession partnerships and
national programmes for the adoption of the EU acquis, and pre-accession assistance
which is mainly allocated through the Phare programme.6 Since 1998, the Commission
has produced yearly reports on each candidate country which identify the areas where
progress is still needed before EU membership can be possible.7
The 1997 Amsterdam European Council called for accession negotiations to start with a
group of six states (Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia)
and negotiations were launched in March 1998. To this purpose, the EU acquis was
divided into 31 chapters: on each chapter, a common negotiating position is adopted by
the Council and is then put forward to each individual candidate country during bilateral
inter-governmental conferences. Accession negotiations also started with another six
countries (Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Romania and Slovakia) in February 2000.
For ten of the twelve countries, negotiations have now been concluded on all 31
chapters. Negotiations are still taking place with Bulgaria and Romania. The first wave
of accession is expected to take place before the next elections for the European
Parliament in 2004. For each country, accession is only possible once negotiations have
been concluded on all chapters of the EU acquis, the draft accession treaty is approved
by the Council with the assent of the Parliament and is ratified by all current Member
States and the country concerned.
When the EU’s eastward enlargement was first envisaged, the main concern was over
the economic gap between EU economies and those of the candidate countries.
Following the Balkan crisis in the first half of the 1990s, there was increasing awareness
                                                
6 The Phare programme was initially set up in 1989 to support the transition to a market-orientated
economy in Poland and Hungary and was subsequently extended to other countries. It is now
complemented by two other funds created in 2000, SAPARD (Special Accession Programme for
Agriculture and Rural Development) and ISPA (Pre-accession Instrument for Structural Policies).
7 For the latest Progress Reports, see http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/report2002/.5
that non-economically related issues such as Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) issues also
needed to be included in the accession negotiations in order to ensure the internal
security of the enlarged EU. The Commission thus recommended that co-operation in
JHA matters be more structured (Lavenex 1998a: 284). One must recall that before
1989, candidate countries did not have any immigration or asylum laws or policies for
the simple reason that there was no immigration to regulate (Grabbe 2000: 529). With
EU accession, these states are bound to become more attractive as countries of
destination and the Langdon Report released in 1995 emphasized the need to adopt
measures against illegal immigration and build efficient asylum systems in candidate
countries (Lavenex 1998a: 288). The inclusion of asylum and immigration matters in
the accession negotiations was also made necessary by the transfer of these matters to
the EC pillar at Amsterdam in 1998. In particular, the Schengen acquis became part of
the EU acquis and, as such, it also had to be adopted by candidate countries.
Co-operation between EU Member States and candidate countries had already
developed in the early 1990s. When Central and Eastern European countries acceded to
the Council of Europe, EU Member States took the opportunity to declare them safe
third countries, despite their unsatisfactory asylum legislation. If these countries were
considered to be safe third countries, asylum seekers who had travelled to the EU via
these countries could be returned there without their application being examined in
substance in any EU Member State.8 Similarly, some Central and Eastern European
countries were also considered safe countries of origin where there was a presumption
of protection: no genuine asylum seeker could come from such countries (Bouteillet-
Paquet 2001: 279-80).9 In order to ensure returns to safe third countries and safe
countries of origin in Central and Eastern Europe, a series of readmission agreements
were concluded. In effect, EU Member States are using these agreements to transfer the
‘asylum burden’ to Central and Eastern European countries.
The nature of the earlier co-operation between EU Member States and candidate
countries in the field of asylum and immigration has set the tone of the current dialogue.
EU Member States consider candidate countries to be a ‘buffer zone’ between
themselves and countries further East. They also know that in the medium to longer
term, when complete freedom of movement of persons is achieved within the enlarged
EU, they will have to rely entirely on the new Member States to control entries into the
EU at the Eastern border. The fear of crime and illegal immigration has prompted
existing Member States to demand strict border controls on the future Eastern border in
order to ensure that the enlarged EU is as secure as it currently is. In practice, agreement
on what constitutes the EU acquis in the field of JHA was reached in May 1998 and is
also referred to as the TAIEX list which names all the texts to which candidate countries
must accede, introduce and/or live up to.10 One can observe that this list contains a
                                                
8 The 1990 Dublin Convention on the allocation of responsibility for examining an asylum application
does not guarantee that an application will be examined by an EU Member State and allows transfers
of asylum-seekers to safe third countries which are not parties to the Convention, see Article 3(5).
9 One must note that some EU Member States do not always agree upon which Central European
countries should be considered to be safe. Nevertheless, once candidate countries become EU Member
States, they will be covered by the 1998 Protocol on asylum for nationals of Member States of the
European Union (or ‘Aznar Protocol’) which states that all EU Member States constitute safe
countries of origin.
10 This list has been reproduced in van Krieken (2000: 104-14).6
number of third-pillar instruments which are not legally binding upon existing Member
States, but which appear to be presented as such to candidate countries (Lavenex 2002:
703). As will be seen below, EU expectations go far beyond the mere adoption of the
EU  acquis: candidate countries must also ‘bring [their] institutions, management
systems and administrative arrangements up to Union standards with a view to
implementing effectively the ‘acquis’, and in particular adopt and implement measures
with respect to external border controls, asylum and immigration, and measures to
prevent and combat organised crime, terrorism and illicit drug trafficking.’11
Negotiations on Chapter 24 on JHA have been concluded and it is already clear that the
commitments undertaken by candidate countries in this field will be closely monitored
before and upon accession. Now is therefore a good time to review what measures
candidate countries must undertake in order to gain the confidence of their new
European partners and, ultimately, EU membership.
3 Setting up new asylum systems in candidate countries: the transfer of the EU
asylum acquis
Before the end of the Cold War, there were no procedures for determining refugee
status, and no provisions regulating the situation of asylum seekers and refugees,
because there was no need for asylum systems in the former Communist States. As the
first asylum seekers arrived in these countries in the early 1990s, the first generation of
asylum legislation was hurriedly adopted. At the same time, all candidate countries
became parties to the 1951 Geneva Convention on the Status of Refugees and its 1967
Protocol.12 Nevertheless, the asylum systems initially set up in candidate countries did
raise some problems in terms of refugee protection standards (Bouteillet-Paquet 2001:
333). This was to be expected since these countries had no tradition of asylum and/or
lacked a human rights culture. When the EU realized this ‘lack of humanitarian
tradition, norms and institutions’, (Lavenex 1998a: 277) more attention was paid to
asylum matters in the accession strategy. Originally, candidate countries adopted
relatively generous policies towards asylum seekers because they had not yet realized
the impact of future EU accession and also thought that the influx of asylum seekers
was going to be temporary (Bouteillet-Paquet 2001: 334). This attitude towards asylum
seekers soon had to be modified as all candidate countries found themselves under the
obligation to adopt the EU asylum acquis and align their practices on the current
restrictive EU policies. A second generation of asylum legislation was adopted in most
candidate countries in the late 1990s in order to reflect these changes.13 In addition, one
                                                
11 EU initial position for the opening of negotiations with the first six countries, Document 6473/3/98
REV 3 JAI 7 ELARG 51, 25 May 1998, reproduced in Seiffarth (2000: 67-68).
12 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 28 July 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 1950 and Protocol
Relating to the Status of Refugees, 31 January 1967, 606 U.N.T.S. 267. See UNHCR, State parties to
the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol as of 30 September
2002, at http://www.unhcr.ch. Hungary had already been a party to the 1951 Convention since 1989
for reasons mentioned.
13 See for instance Czech Republic: Act No. 325 of 11 November 1999 on Asylum, Estonia: Law on
Refugees of 18 February 1997, Hungary: Act CXXXIX of 9 December 1997 on Asylum, Poland:
Aliens Law of 25 June 1997 (amended by the Act of 11 April 2001), Slovenia: Law on Asylum of 30
July 1999.7
project funded by the Phare Programme started in April 1998 in order to help candidate
countries adapt their asylum legislation and improve its implementation.14
EU assistance to candidate countries in the field of asylum has two underlying
objectives. Firstly, it is in the interest of current Member States, most notably Germany,
to improve asylum systems in candidate countries. Indeed, if these countries implement
refugee protection standards that are equivalent to those of Western European States,
such states will have less difficulty justifying returns of asylum seekers because they
will benefit from an equivalent level of protection in candidate countries. In other
words, by improving protection capacities in candidate countries, Member States are
preparing them to receive returned asylum seekers and hoping that they will be able to
shift the ‘asylum burden’ eastwards (Byrne et al. 2002b: 17). Although the motivation
of Member States can be seen as problematic, EU pressure to implement changes in the
asylum systems of candidate countries has brought about some positive consequences.
Asylum procedures have been adopted and/or improved, specialized administrative
structures have been set up to deal with asylum seekers and refugees, support groups
have been created, and so on. It must be noted, though, that significant differences
remain between candidate countries, with the Czech Republic, Poland and Slovenia
much ahead of the others. The second objective of EU efforts to modify asylum systems
in candidate countries is to ensure that these countries do not become too attractive to
asylum seekers: they must therefore also adopt deterrence measures similar to those
already in place in Western Europe.
One can wonder whether restrictive EU standards currently being imposed on candidate
countries are adapted to those countries’ situation. A UNHCR officer has noted that
‘some CEBS (Central Europe and Baltic States) have adopted notions they might not
otherwise have contemplated introducing’ (Petersen 2002: 367). For instance,
accelerated procedures have been introduced in all candidate countries’ asylum systems
to deal with manifestly unfounded applications.15 One may argue that in some cases,
these procedures have been introduced without the necessary procedural safeguards and
in any case, what candidate countries need are efficient, rather than accelerated,
procedures. Indeed, the usefulness of accelerated procedures can be doubted for
countries such as Estonia, for instance, which receives less than 30 asylum seekers per
year.16 Candidate countries have also incorporated other well-established EU concepts
such as ‘safe third country’17 and ‘safe country of origin’ whose conformity with
international refugee protection standards may be in doubt (ECRE 1998). As candidate
countries are going through the transition from countries of transit where asylum
                                                
14 This Joint Support Program on the Application of the EU Acquis on Asylum and Related Standards
and Practices in the Associated Countries of Central and Eastern Europe resulted from co-operation
between the Commission, UNHCR and the German Federal Office for the Recognition of Refugees,
with the assistance of six other Member States (Austria, Denmark, France, the Netherlands, Spain and
Sweden). For more detail, see Anagnost (2000).
15 On accelerated procedures, see van der Klaauw (2001: 180-183).
16 See table above. On accelerated procedures, see for instance Article 9 of the Estonian Law on
Refugees of 18 February 1997; Articles 43-47 of the Hungarian Act CXXXIX of 9 December 1997 on
Asylum; and Article 14(2) of the Lithuanian Refugee Law of 29 June 2000, No. VII-1784, No. 56-
1651.
17 On the adoption of the safe third country concept by candidate countries, see Lavenex (1998b: 138).8
seekers did not stop to lodge an application, to countries of destination, they must focus
on establishing asylum procedures and reception conditions which are in full conformity
with international human rights law and refugee law. They should not merely import EU
policies which may not be adapted to their current asylum situation and/or
administrative structures and practices.
One of the main problems encountered by candidate countries relates to the fact that the
exact content of the EU asylum provisions, which they are to adopt, is currently being
defined by Member States. There is thus uncertainty as to what norms must be
implemented (the problem of the ‘moving target’) (Lavenex 2002: 702-4). European
asylum law has only emerged in the last few years and is not yet very elaborate. At the
moment, it is mainly composed of non-binding instruments adopted in the first half of
the 1990s.18 These non-binding instruments were presented to candidate countries as
binding and therefore to be implemented by them: there has thus been a ‘hardening’ of
soft law which is a cause for concern (Anagnost 2000: 386). These instruments were
supplemented by international conventions concluded outside the EU framework such
as the Dublin Convention on asylum and the Schengen Implementation Agreement
which contains some provisions dealing with asylum.19 It was only in 1998 that asylum
became an EC competence under Article 63 EC which envisages the adoption of
legally-binding instruments in a number of areas by April 2004. So far, some
instruments have been adopted and are now clearly part of the EU asylum acquis to be
adopted by candidate countries.20 Nevertheless, the other proposed directives which are
also more important remain under negotiation and candidate countries can only
speculate as to what their final content will be.21 At this point, when adopting new
asylum legislation, they can try to anticipate EU developments and, if in doubt, may
choose the most restrictive standards in order to demonstrate that they can stem the
                                                
18 See for instance Resolution on manifestly unfounded applications for asylum, Resolution on a
harmonised approach to questions concerning host third countries, Conclusions on countries in which
there is generally no serious risk of persecution (London, 30 November and 1 December 1992), and
Council Resolution of 20 June 1995 on minimum guarantees for asylum procedures, OJ 1996 C
274/13.
19 Convention determining the State responsible for examining applications for asylum lodged in one of
the Member States of the European Communities, 15 June 1990 (hereinafter the Dublin Convention)
OJ 1997 C 254/1, and Agreement on the Implementation of the Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985
concerning the Gradual Abolition of Checks at their Common Borders, 19 June 1990 (1991) 30 ILM
84. For more detail, see Hailbronner and Thiery (1997).
20 Council directive No. 2001/55 of 20 July 2001 on minimum standards for giving temporary protection
in the event of a mass influx of displaced persons and on measures promoting a balance of efforts
between Member States in receiving such persons and bearing the consequences thereof, OJ 2001 L
212/12; Council directive No. 2003/9 of 27 January 2003 laying down minimum standards for the
reception of asylum seekers, OJ 2003 L 31/18; Council regulation No 343/2003 of 18 February 2003
establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member states responsible for
examining an asylum application lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national, OJ
2003 L 50/1.
21 Proposal for a Council directive laying down minimum standards for the qualification and status of
third country nationals and stateless persons as refugees, in accordance with the 1951 Convention
relating to the status of refugees and the 1967 Protocol, or as persons who otherwise need
international protection, 12 September 2001, COM(2001) 510 final; Proposal for a Council Directive
on minimum standards on procedures in Member States for granting and withdrawing refugee status,
20 September 2000, COM(2000) 578 final.9
influx of asylum seekers as well as current Member States. What we are also witnessing
is candidate countries amending their asylum and immigration legislation almost on a
yearly basis in order to take into account recently adopted EU instruments: such
frequent legislative changes create serious challenges to the stability and certainty of the
law in candidate countries.
A more detailed analysis of the asylum provisions adopted by Poland in 1997 and 2001
illustrates how the EU asylum acquis is being transferred to the legal system of a
candidate country. Although Poland became a party to the 1951 Convention and its
1967 Protocol on 27 September 1991, there were no specific asylum procedures in place
in the country.22 At the time, Polish authorities seemed to believe that the sudden influx
of asylum seekers would soon cease and that no permanent bodies or procedures were
necessary (Stainsby 1990: 637). However, as a result of readmission agreements signed
with EU countries, as well as an increase in direct arrivals, the numbers of asylum
seekers in Poland continued to increase.23 These asylum seekers were mainly from
Russia, Romania, Armenia, Bulgaria and Azerbaijan (in order of decreasing numbers)
(Mikolajczyk 2002: 52). Moreover, it became increasingly clear that Poland would have
to adopt the EU asylum acquis before accession. It was thus decided that Poland needed
an asylum system in order to determine which asylum seekers should be granted refugee
status.
It must be noted here that a large number of asylum seekers appear to be persons who
have been returned from Germany under the readmission agreement signed on 29
March 1991 with Schengen countries and the separate readmission agreement signed
with Germany on 7 May 1993.24 Under the safe third country rule adopted by Germany,
it is almost impossible to obtain asylum in that country if one has travelled via Poland
(Grabbe 2000: 529) and the overwhelming majority of asylum seekers in Germany have
entered through the German-Polish border (Lavenex 1998b: 140). In effect, Poland has
thus become a de facto member of the Dublin Convention system as it receives asylum
seekers who have travelled to the EU via Poland, but it is not allowed to transfer asylum
seekers to the EU (Lavenex 1998b: 132-33). Poland was encouraged to sign the
readmission agreement with Germany in exchange for funding of 120 million DM to
improve its asylum systems and border controls (Bouteillet-Paquet 2001: 292).
The 1997 Aliens Act constitutes the first attempt to regulate comprehensively the
situation of asylum seekers and refugees in Poland.25 Chapter 5 of the Aliens Act deals
with refugee status. It appears that the legislation has introduced satisfactory procedural
standards which include, for instance, the right for asylum seekers to be informed in a
language they understand (Article 33), the right to a personal interview (Article 40) and
                                                
22 Some amendments were made to the 1963 Aliens Act in 1991, but proved completely insufficient to
deal with the situation, see Czaplinski (1994: 637).
23 See table above. A very high proportion of these applications (55 per cent in 1998) are discontinued as
a result of the applicants disappearing, probably trying to enter the EU.
24 In 1998, there were 698 asylum applications lodged at the German-Polish border (Mikolajczyk 2002:
53). To this figure, one must add the number of applications lodged by asylum seekers re-admitted
from Germany within the country.
25 Aliens Act No. 114, 25 June 1997, OGRP, No. 739/1997. For more detail, see Chlebny and Trojan
(2000).10
the right to contact the UN High Commissioner for Refugees’ Office (UNHCR) (Article
49). Initial decisions on asylum applications were taken by the Ministry of Internal
Affairs and this responsibility has now been transferred to a specific body called the
Office for Repatriation and Aliens which was set up in 2001. Chapter 10 of the Aliens
Act creates a new institution to examine asylum appeals, the Refugee Board, which was
established in 1999. Further appeals can be made to the Supreme Administrative Court
but only an extremely small number of decisions are reversed on appeal (Mikolajczyk
2002: 55).
On paper, the laws and procedures adopted by Poland in 1997 appear to be in
conformity with international refugee and human rights standards,26 but have been
restrictively and/or not properly implemented. For instance, time limits for lodging an
application were initially interpreted quite strictly until the Supreme Administrative
Court intervened (Chlebny and Trojan 2000: 220-21). These time limits were removed
in 2001. It has also been reported that many initial interviews of asylum seekers were
not conducted by qualified immigration officers (Monar 2001: 42). This raises the more
general problem of lack of resources, staff and training. Consequently and despite the
low number of applications compared with Western Europe, there is already a backlog
of cases which were initially supposed to be decided within three months (Article 41).
This period was extended to six months in 2001, but is still shorter than the average
time actually needed to obtain a decision on an asylum application. The recognition rate
remains just below 2 per cent, which is extremely low, even for Western European
standards (Noll 2002: 322).27
Amendments to the 1997 Aliens Act were introduced in 2001, partly to meet EU
requirements.28 The two main changes in the field of asylum were the introduction of
accelerated procedures (Article 41a) and the development of a temporary protection
status (Chapter 6a). Nevertheless, although Article 53 provides that nobody can be
deported if he would be exposed to a breach of the European Convention on Human
Rights,29 no subsidiary status currently exists in Polish law (Mikolajczyk 2002: 73-74):
failed asylum seekers who can nonetheless not be deported, mainly Chechens, are
merely given a temporary residence permit and are not entitled to any support.30 Some
form of ‘tolerated status’ will be created to remedy this situation. Indeed, Polish
authorities are currently drafting new laws to be adopted in 2003. The 1997 Aliens Act
is to be replaced by two separate pieces of legislation on asylum and the regulation of
immigration (entry, residence and exit). Every effort is made to ensure that the new
legislation implements recently adopted EU standards without questioning the validity
and conformity of these standards with international standards.
                                                
26 Interview with Christian Mahr, UNHCR London, 29 September 2001.
27 Other candidate countries such as Hungary and the Czech Republic also have very low recognition
rates, which puts them amongst the most restrictive countries in Europe.
28 See 2001 Regular Report on Poland’s Progress towards accession, SEC(2001) 1752, 13 November
2001, 87. I would like to thank Katarzyna Cuadrat-Grzybowska for providing me with an English
translation of the amended 1997 Aliens Act.
29 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 4 November
1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221.
30 Interview with Irena Rzeplinska, Warsaw, 11 June 2002.11
In drafting and amending the 1997 Aliens Act, most EU asylum standards contained in
soft law instruments have largely been ‘taken into account’ by Polish authorities, that is,
implemented, as they believe that these instruments will be shortly adopted as legally
binding. It is significant to note that, when assessing the conformity of the 1997 Aliens
Act with EU standards, references are frequently made to soft law instruments. Current
negotiations on the Commission asylum proposals made under Article 63 EC are closely
monitored, but it is clear that Poland cannot amend its legislation each time a new
directive or regulation is adopted by the EU. As mentioned above, new legislation has
been drafted in order to take into account EU legislative developments of the last few
years and the Polish Government is keen to see its adoption as soon as possible, that is,
before the EU adopts more texts which would require the Government to further amend
its proposals.
EU influence has had some positive consequences on the treatment of asylum seekers in
Poland. Unfortunately, Poland has also adopted a number of restrictive measures
borrowed from EU practice. For instance in 1997, Poland adopted the concepts of safe
country of origin and safe third country as defined in Article 4(10) and 4(11) of the
Aliens Act. However, these concepts were not always correctly applied: Article 35(3) of
the 1997 Act provided that access to asylum procedures would be denied to anyone
arriving from a safe third country to which he can return. This was an incorrect
implementation of the EU soft law standards31 and the provision could not have been
said to be in conformity with international refugee law standards. As a result, this
provision was amended in 2001. In order to implement the ‘safe country of origin’ and
‘safe third country’ rules, the Polish Government was required to adopt lists of safe
countries under former Article 95. However, it failed to agree on such lists. In practice,
these concepts could thus not be applied (Mikolajczyk 2002: 70). The requirement of
adopting lists of safe countries was abandoned in 2001 and it seems that the two
concepts can now be applied. In any case, although current EU Member States apply
these concepts to candidate countries (Lavenex 1998b), it seems unlikely that Poland
would similarly be able to declare its eastern neighbours safe countries in order to be
able to send asylum seekers there. Nevertheless, Bulgarian and Romanian asylum
seekers have seen their applications rejected on the basis that they were coming from
safe countries of origin.32 Poland may be anticipating the application of the Protocol on
asylum added by the Treaty of Amsterdam which stipulates that ‘Member States shall
be regarded as constituting safe countries of origin.’33
Poland has also introduced accelerated procedures for manifestly unfounded
applications (Article 41a) which are defined as applications not specifying any ground
of persecution under the 1951 Convention or which are intentionally misleading.
Manifestly unfounded applications include applications made by nationals of safe
countries of origin. Article 41a constitutes a perfect example of the 1997 Act being
amended to conform with a soft law instrument such as the 1992 London Resolution on
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32 Telephone interview with Marek Szonert, Warsaw, 26 June 2002. In 2000, 308 persons (members of
the Roma community) from Bulgaria and 864 from Romania sought asylum in Poland (Mikolajczyk
2002: 52).
33 Protocol on asylum for nationals of Member States of the European Union, annexed to the EC Treaty
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manifestly unfounded applications for asylum (Mikolajczyk 2002: 70). This non-
binding Resolution invites EU Member States to consider certain types of applications
as manifestly unfounded and the application of accelerated procedures to examine such
applications. One can note that Poland has chosen to consider as manifestly unfounded
most types of applications mentioned in the Resolution.
For a country which currently ‘only’ receives less than 5,000 asylum applications per
year, one can wonder how appropriate the mere transposition of EU measures to the
Polish legal system is and whether Poland would have adopted a similar asylum policy
regardless of EU requirements. It can be argued that Poland would have adopted the
same standards anyway: due to a lack of asylum tradition, it would have looked to its
Western neighbours for models of asylum systems. On the other hand, EU standards
and practice would not have been copied with the same zeal and Poland could have
independently developed its own asylum policy. In the current situation, Poland has
little choice but to adopt the EU asylum acquis in its entirety before EU accession.
Perhaps the alternative would have been for Polish authorities to challenge parts of the
EU asylum acquis whose conformity with international refugee law is in doubt. This
could have made Poland an active partner in the shaping of the developing EU asylum
system.34
Enlargement has provided an opportunity for candidate countries to establish
comprehensive asylum systems and standards with EU assistance and funding. On the
other hand, the export of current EU asylum policies without reform simply entrenches
restrictive practices which may not be in conformity with international refugee and
human rights standards. Nevertheless, whilst it appears that some EU Member States
have put pressure on candidate countries to initiate some changes in their asylum
systems, there is no doubt that they have been much more interested in investing in the
improvement of border controls which is perceived as an essential requirement for
ensuring the internal security of the enlarged EU.
Restricting entries: new visa requirements
One area which is likely to raise a number of problems is the EU’s visa policy which
has become a central instrument of (asylum) migration control. Candidate countries
have to adopt the EU’s strict visa policy which requires nationals of a long list of
countries to apply for a visa in order to gain entry to the EU.35 All refugee-producing
countries are included in this list and since it is not possible to lodge an asylum
application from outside the country considering the application, visa requirements
hinder access to asylum procedures. Most candidate countries had visa-free regimes
with their eastern and southern neighbours. EU Member States are especially concerned
about restricting the entry of nationals of these new states resulting from the
disintegration of the Soviet Union, all of which are included in the EU visa list with the
                                                
34 Email exchange with Michal Kowalski, 15 July 2002.
35 See Regulation No. 539/2001 of 15 March 2001 listing the third countries whose nationals must be in
possession of visas when crossing the external borders and those whose nationals are exempt from
this requirement, amended by Regulation No. 2414/2001 of 7 December 2001 (deleting Romania from
the visa list).13
exception of the Baltic States. However, candidate countries are reluctant to impose visa
requirements on their neighbours with whom they have often maintained close political
and economic links (Jileva 2002: 686-9). Moreover, some candidate countries want to
allow national minorities living in neighbouring countries easy access to their territory.
For instance, up to 3 millions ethnic Hungarians are living outside Hungary as a result
of the 1920 Treaty of Trianon.36 Finally, it must be noted that some of the former Soviet
Republics are still refugee-producing countries and the imposition of strict visa
requirements would in effect contribute to denying persecuted individuals access to
protection. It has been recommended that the EU should consider the long-standing
relationships between the candidate countries and their neighbours, and envisage special
visa arrangements such as fast-track, multiple-entry visas or single-country visas (House
of Lords 2002: para. 76). Hungary had also suggested special visa arrangements for
ethnic Hungarians living abroad, but these proposals were abandoned (Grabbe 2000:
531).
Poland has already terminated visa exemption agreements with a number of countries,
mainly former Soviet Union Republics and other Communist States.37 However, Polish
authorities have been much more reluctant to do the same with regard to its immediate
eastern neighbours, namely Belarus, Russia and Ukraine: the introduction of visas for
citizens of these countries has posed a dilemma for domestic policy-makers who want to
protect close historical, cultural and economic links with them. There is, indeed, a
concern that the introduction of visas will pose a threat to economic activities in eastern
areas (Anderson 2000): such activities have been partly fuelled by ‘shuttle migration’
from Ukraine for instance (Iglicka 2001: 8 and Wolczuk 2002: 245). Moreover, there
are some Polish minorities living in Belarus (418,000) and Ukraine (220,000) who want
to retain easy access to the Polish territory (IOM/ICPMD 1999: 112). Finally,
successive Polish governments have pursued dynamic foreign policies towards their
eastern neighbours, in particular Ukraine, in order to stabilize the region (Wolczuk
2001).
Measures introduced in 1998 to restrict entries from Belarus and Russia have already
provoked strong protests from these countries (Grabbe 2000: 530). This may explain
why Poland has been delaying the introduction of visas for as long as possible. Visas
were initially to be introduced in 2001 for these two countries and in 2002 for Ukraine
(Mikolajczyk 2002: 60), but these dates were considered to be premature and visas will
now be introduced on 1 October 2003 for all three countries. Such new visa
requirements are likely to have an impact on Chechen asylum seekers who continue to
be the most numerous among those seeking asylum in Poland.38
The introduction of visas will contribute to a shift of responsibility for immigration
control from border services to internal administrative services which will deal with an
increased number of applications for residence permits (as migrants will use other
means of entering and staying in the country) (Iglicka 2001: 13) and external embassies
                                                
36 See Zielonka (2001: 514) and Grabbe (2002: 531). See also the case of Romanian minorities in
Moldova (Le Monde 2002).
37 See 2001 Regular Report, supra  note 28, at 85 and 2002 Regular Report, SEC (2002) 1408, 9
September 2002, 113-114.
38 See 2002 Regular Report, supra note 37, at 115.14
dealing with visa applications. The implementation of the new visa regime required by
the EU will not be cost-free and embassies will have to be staffed and equipped to deal
with high numbers of visa requests. It is also to be expected that some asylum seekers
will have to turn to illegal channels of migration as a result of the new visa
requirements. In order to limit the negative impact of visas, it is crucial to ensure that
the issuing of visas remains as easy and cheap as possible (IOM/ICPMD 1999: 115).
The Russian enclave of Kaliningrad raises some specific problems because it will soon
be surrounded by EU Member States: Russians transiting EU territory by land between
Kaliningrad and the rest of Russia will have to hold a passport and transit visa.39
4 Preventing illegal entries: border controls at the EU’s future Eastern borders
During the 1990s, the EU’s internal security agenda has been developing at a fast pace.
One of the central elements of this agenda is external border controls which are
becoming increasingly elaborate. Border controls are regulated within the Schengen
framework which has been integrated into the EU acquis since Amsterdam. The
improvement of border controls in candidate countries is seen as an essential condition
for accession. When visa requirements are imposed, illegal entry may constitute the
only way of getting access to asylum procedures and border controls which are
reinforced to prevent illegal entries are therefore bound to have an impact on access to
protection.
The Commission has been keen to stress the ‘need to strengthen border management,
most urgently at future EU external borders, and to prepare for the participation in the
Schengen Information System.’40 Each of its country reports produced yearly focuses
on the need to improve border controls. This has thus become the main EU demand in
JHA and a priority area for EU aid. Indeed, many Phare projects on migration and
border control have been funded in the last few years. In particular, candidate countries
need elaborate technological frameworks to enter the Schengen Information System
(SIS) which is a computerized system storing information on persons, and stolen
vehicles and objects for the use of border control. Besides, the SIS requires the setting
up of effective data protection mechanisms. Border services also need to invest in
expensive surveillance equipment such as thermo/infrared cameras, x-ray-units and
police helicopters (House of Lords 2000: para. 14). All in all, the adoption of the
Schengen standards of border controls is not so much a problem of political will, but of
resources and is already proving to be extremely expensive for candidate countries.
Aside from the funding problem, a fundamental change of attitude is also required from
border guards who now have to ‘keep foreigners out rather than keep citizens in’
(Grabbe 2000: 529). The complete overhaul of border control mechanisms in candidate
countries thus requires an important amount of human and financial resources, as well
as training, and will not be achieved as promptly as Member States would wish.
Nevertheless, no concessions are being granted and the Schengen acquis must be
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complied with in full,41 even though it is well-known that some current Member States
still do not comply with it (House of Lords 2000: para. 25). In reality, there is doubt as
to whether the candidate countries will be able to implement the Schengen acquis in full
by the time of accession (House of Lords 2000: para. 52). If this is the case, the problem
remains that candidate countries are uncertain about what standards of border control,
short of the Schengen standards, they are supposed to reach in order to gain accession
(House of Lords 2000: para. 54). Considering how costly upgrading border controls is,
there is also uncertainty as to whether the borders with Bulgaria and Romania should
also be ‘sealed’ to the same extent as the eastern borders: since these countries are also
to join the EU within the next few years, it would appear counterproductive to invest in
border control infrastructures which will then have to be dismantled.
Poland has always been a country of mass emigration since the mid-nineteenth century.
Immigration to Poland has traditionally been negligible, hence the lack of immigration
controls (Stola 2001: 176). This lack of controls, particularly on the Eastern border, has
been a major source of concern for the EU because of the nature and location of this
border. This ‘green border’ which runs through open country and mountains is difficult
to police and has traditionally been a relatively open border with many cross-border
activities (Monar 2001: 43). Poland shares more than 1,000 km of borders with Belarus,
Ukraine and Russia, countries which are unlikely to join the EU in the near, or even
distant, future and host criminal networks which try to smuggle goods and people into
the EU.
Over the last few years, Poland has been under considerable pressure from the EU to
adopt measures to establish and reinforce border controls. One must remember that
before 1989, there were no Polish border guards on the eastern border, only Soviet
border guards: most border controls took place on the western and southern borders
(Monar 2001: 44). The challenge was thus to organize a complete overhaul of the
border guard service (Latawski 1999). More crossing points were established on the
eastern border, several thousand new staff were recruited and trained, equipment was
purchased and so on. The EU, as well as individual Member States such as Germany
and the UK (House of Lords 2000: para. 63), have invested considerable resources in
the export of EU border control technology and staff training: it was estimated that
Poland has received over 100 million euros of Phare funding to upgrade its eastern
frontier controls (House of Lords 2000: para. 61). Nevertheless, raising border controls
to Schengen standards is proving extremely expensive and EU funding is still
insufficient to implement all the required changes (House of Lords 2000: para. 60).
With the lack of funding, training border guards to deal with asylum-seekers is probably
not a priority. EU efforts have so far focused on reinforcing controls at the Polish
eastern border and extending the EU visa regime to its eastern neighbours. There is no
doubt that EU accession has been ‘the main stimulus for rebuilding the system of border
control’ (Mikolajczyk 2002: 58).
Even though the candidate countries are under pressure to comply fully with the
Schengen  acquis, they will not be fully part of Schengen when they become EU
Member States. Indeed, free movement of persons will not be allowed in the years
following accession. Transitional arrangements have been negotiated whereby free
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movement of workers will be guaranteed within seven years following accession.42 This
can be partly explained by the fear, notably in Germany and Austria, of a mass influx of
migrants from the East similar to that witnessed in the final months leading to the fall of
the Berlin Wall in 1989 (Zielonka 2001: 520). It follows that candidate countries have
to comply with the obligations arising from Schengen before  benefiting from the
advantages in terms of abolition of internal border controls and free movement of
persons.43 In other words, tougher border controls must first be applied on the eastern
borders of the candidate countries, and only then will concessions be made on their
western borders (Grabbe 2000: 527). It has been argued that the current EU demands on
border controls ‘might well be used as a pretext for postponing the free movement of
labour and other persons for a long time’ (Lavenex 1998a: 293). It is ironic that while
Western States used to criticize Communist States during the Cold War for imposing
restrictions on the free movement of their own citizens, they now impose such
restrictions on the very same persons (Bouteillet-Paquet 2001: 263), although they are
obviously of a very different nature.
5 Facilitating returns: re-admission agreements
There is no doubt that the most important obligation arising from the 1951 Convention
to which all candidate countries are party is the obligation of non-refoulement (Article
33): state parties shall not return a refugee to a country where he would face threats to
his life or freedom. The scope of this obligation has been extended beyond the refugee
context by the Convention against Torture (Article 3)44 and the ECHR case law on
Article 3 (Lambert 1999). Nevertheless, all candidate countries have started concluding
re-admission agreements in order to facilitate the return of illegal immigrants and some
asylum seekers.45 When examining the text of some of these re-admission agreements,
it appears that they may not contain sufficient guarantees against non-refoulement.
As a result of the 1991 readmission agreement which allows Schengen countries to
return to Poland anyone who has entered the Schengen area illegally via Poland, as well
as rejected asylum seekers, an increasing number of persons have been readmitted to
Poland, particularly from Germany. With EU accession and entry into the Dublin
Convention system, Poland can expect a further increase in the number of asylum
seekers transferred from other Member States, but it does not want to become the final
destination for these asylum seekers. Consequently, it has endeavoured to negotiate and
sign bilateral readmission agreements with its own neighbours: throughout the 1990s,
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rights of nationals from the new Member States. For the next three years, they will be free to apply the
EU acquis and remove obstacles to free movement. This transitional period can be extended for a
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43 See Commission, supra note 40, at 5.
44 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 10
December 1984, 23 I.L.M. 1027 and 24 I.L.M. 535.
45 See the full list of agreements concluded by candidate countries, see Lavenex (2002: 708).17
Poland has managed to sign such agreements with all other candidate countries and
some of its eastern neighbours.46 It is also currently negotiating readmission agreements
with Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia and even countries further afield such as
Vietnam. These readmission agreements are aimed at facilitating the transfer of illegal
immigrants, which includes some asylum seekers, to other countries: Poland is, in
effect, adopting the same strategy as Schengen States in order to ensure that people
cannot stay in Poland.
The readmission agreements concluded by Poland with its neighbours are very varied.
Most of them cover not only nationals of both parties to the agreement, but also third
country nationals. One would expect Poland to conclude readmission agreements only
with countries which are deemed safe for anyone to be returned to, but it is debatable
whether some countries, such as Bulgaria or Romania, can be regarded as safe for
certain rejected asylum seekers of Roma origin.47 Some agreements which cover
asylum seekers do not contain any reference to the 1951 Convention, or even, in some
cases, to any human rights instrument.48
One minimum prerequisite before signing a readmission agreement should be to ensure
that the other party is at least a party to the 1951 Convention, which should guarantee
that it is under the obligation of non-refoulement. However, it is worrying to note that a
number of readmission agreements were signed with countries which were not parties to
the 1951 Convention at the time of signature. For instance, Poland signed readmission
agreements with Estonia and Latvia in 1993 although both countries only became
parties to the 1951 Convention in 1997. In most cases, Poland seemed to have waited
until the other State party to the impending agreement had signed the 1951
Convention.49 There is also a concern that Poland has signed or is about to conclude
readmission agreements with countries which are still refugee-producing countries and
which figure amongst the list of the main countries of origin of asylum seekers in
Poland.50
The readmission agreement concluded between Poland and Lithuania in 1998 is
undoubtedly one of the most important to the extent that both countries are on one of the
main migrant routes to Western Europe. It covers nationals of both countries and third
country nationals, including asylum seekers (Article 3). However, the agreement
contains no reference to the 1951 Convention, nor does it guarantee access to asylum
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procedures:51 UNHCR has already expressed concern at ‘the automatic return of
asylum seekers to Lithuania without due consideration for the safety of the asylum
seekers from refoulement, or the possibility of their entering the status determination
procedure in Lithuania.’52 As a result, the combination of the Dublin Convention, the
application of the safe third country rule and the conclusion of re-admission agreements
between Poland and its eastern neighbours can lead to ‘chain deportations’, sometimes
all the way to countries of origin (Byrne et al. 2002b: 25).
It appears that some of the readmission agreements signed by candidate countries with
their neighbours do not contain enough guarantees that asylum seekers are not removed
by these states to yet another third country which may not be safe and/or may even be
the country of origin. To some extent, candidate countries are replicating the German
strategy which has been to sign readmission agreements with all its eastern
neighbours.53 Nevertheless, Germany has also attempted to engage in bilateral
cooperation with these countries to reinforce their protection capacities: candidate
countries cannot offer the same level of support to their eastern neighbours as Germany
has done for its neighbours.54
6 Conclusion
The hard border regime imposed by the EU on candidate countries is likely to have an
important impact on asylum seekers. When examining the asylum laws of candidate
countries, it appears that they are already, or will soon be, providing the same level of
refugee protection as current EU Member States. Nevertheless, grave concerns must be
expressed about the lack of strong guarantees against direct and indirect refoulement.
Risks of refoulement are being increased by the introduction of strict immigration
measures and these risks are not being correctly evaluated because of the current lack of
connection between migration control and asylum (ECRE 1998: para. 5). Despite EU
pressure, candidate countries must not forget that they have international obligations not
to return people to situations where their life or security would be at risk. This shows
that EU demands are inconsistent to the extent that candidate countries must
demonstrate their commitment to democracy and human rights whilst, at the same time,
adopting restrictive asylum and immigration policies towards foreigners. Candidate
countries’ adherence to international human rights law and refugee law is thus being
tested and it is important that domestic developments in the areas of immigration and
asylum continue to be scrutinized.
Earlier EU developments in the field of immigration and asylum already demonstrated
the prioritization of security concerns over humanitarian concerns and followed a strong
logic of inclusion/exclusion as illustrated by strict border controls. Current efforts to
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52 Background information on the situation in Poland in the context of the return of asylum seekers,
UNHCR Geneva, November 1998, quoted in Mikolajczyk (2002: 62).
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54 Interview with Christian Mahr, London, 29 September 2001.19
align candidate countries to EU policies follow the same logic. Recent developments,
analysed above, also show the prioritization of security concerns over legitimate
economic or foreign policy concerns. Not surprisingly, candidate countries are
becoming increasingly nervous about accession as they have realized that ‘asylum and
immigration are being instrumentalised by EU Member States in order to establish a
filter or buffer zone between them and the countries of emigration’ (Lavenex 1998a:
290). With EU accession, the responsibility for ensuring border controls, tackling illegal
immigration and dealing with asylum seekers will fall disproportionately on candidate
countries which do not have the same financial and human resources. So far, these
countries have been so keen to gain EU membership that they have agreed to adopt
most measures.
The EU is still under the illusion that efficient border control mechanisms can ensure its
internal security. Firstly, there is no such thing as perfect border controls and migrants
who are persistent will always find a way in. In any case, border controls alone cannot
stem the flow of asylum-seekers and other migrants or ensure the EU’s internal security:
the EU should address the causes of migration (poverty, human rights violations, armed
conflict, etc.) through its foreign and aid policies. It is also in the interest of the EU to
ensure political stability in the region and maintain good relations with its immediate
neighbours. It is thus important that it respects candidate countries’ special relationships
with their eastern neighbours, instead of imposing its own policies on them without
taking into account their foreign policy interests.20
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